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a b s t r a c t
Easy associations with wireless access points (APs) give users temporal and quick access
to the Internet. It needs only a few seconds to take their machines to hotspots and do a
little configuration in order to have Internet access. However, this portability becomes a
double-edged sword for ignorant network users. Network protocol analyzers are typically
developed for network performance analysis. Nonetheless, they can also be used to reveal
user’s privacy by classifying network traffic. Some characteristics in IEEE 802.11 traffic
particularly help identify users. Like actual human fingerprints, there are also unique traffic
characteristics for each network user. They are called network user fingerprints, by tracking
whichmore than half of network users can be connected to their traffic even with medium
access control (MAC) layer pseudonyms. On the other hand, the concept of network user
fingerprint is likely to be a powerful tool for intrusion detection and computer/digital
forensics. As with actual criminal investigations, comparison of sampling data to training
datamay increase confidence in criminal specification. This article focuses on a survey on a
user fingerprinting technique of IEEE 802.11wireless LAN traffic.We also summarize some
of the researches on IEEE 802.11 network characteristic analysis to figure out rogue APs and
MAC protocol misbehaviors.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN (Wi-Fi) enables us easy Internet connections. A fundamental unit of a Wi-Fi network is called
a Basic Service Set (BSS) and consists of a wireless AP and several wireless stations, such as laptop PCs or PDAs [1]. Although
a wireless LAN provides many benefits such as easy deployment of wireless stations, nevertheless, it is easily exposed to
many security problems. For example, due to the nature of thewirelessmedium, radio signals are vulnerable to interception
of eavesdroppers. Apparently, some information, such as Medium Access Control (MAC) address, helps adversaries to
identify network devices. More precisely, because MAC addresses are uniquely assigned to network interface cards (NICs)
by manufacturers, if adversaries could associate them with individuals, identifying users from the MAC addresses is not a
difficult task [1]. Basically, the MAC address is persistent for the entire life of a device, which is just like a unique social
security number for an individual [1]. Usually, the MAC address is clear during a data communication.
Although IEEE 802.11 provides security protection mechanisms, such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi
Protected Access (WPA), the protection is not extended to the MAC address anonymity [2]. Basically, user and service
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authentication, as well as data confidentiality and integrity, are only covered by WEP (which is already deprecated by IEEE
for vulnerability issues) andWPA protocols. Thus, in order to embody theMAC address anonymity, several works suggested
virtual MAC address utilization. That is, to conceal theMAC address during a data communication transaction, each wireless
station should have a different MAC address at a different session, rather than persisting only oneMAC address for its whole
life [2].
However,work in [2] demonstrated thatmerely employment of pseudonyms forMACaddress is insufficient to hide user’s
identity from adversaries in a Wi-Fi network. Although pseudonyms can help preventing explicit associations of the MAC
addresswith individuals, network packets sent bywireless stations still contain information that can be used to expose their
location privacy. According to [2], these characteristics are called implicit identifiers. Examples of the implicit identifiers
include the IP address of a service that a user frequently accesses, clock skew exposed by TCP timestamps and clickprints by
users when they browse theWeb [2]. For instance, unlike the MAC address, the IP address is not persistent for host devices.
However, the IP requests sent by wireless stations may indicate some user’s preferences although their own IP addresses
cannot tell much about the senders. Network users may have their bookmarked websites and preferred e-mail servers. By
use of implicit identifiers, the majority of users could be tracked by adversaries with nearly 90% accuracy [2]. Moreover,
these implicit identifiers can be easily captured by network protocol analyzers, such asWireshark and tcpdump, and for the
worse, this kind of software can be easily obtained commercially. Additionally, wireless geographic logging engines, such as
WiGLE.net, help retrieve the geographical information of wireless access points (APs) [3]. Thus, it is relatively easy to reveal
the geographical location of each network device from that of APs [2].
On the other hand, an analysis of network traffic is also used to detect rogue APs or unauthorized APs as well as MAC
protocol misbehavior. Rogue APs are usually installed by ignorant employees in order to extend their company benefits but
with the minimum security settings. Accordingly, their actions often generate security vulnerabilities allowing hackers to
compromise the company’s systems. Although rogue APs are currently detectedmostly by rudimentary approaches, authors
in [4] propose a new approach utilizing a network traffic analysis.
This article provides a comprehensive survey on IEEE 802.11 user fingerprinting and its applications. The rest of the article
is outlined as follows. We first review the Ethernet and Wi-Fi MAC layer protocols, and then we go through network traffic
characteristics peculiar to the Wi-Fi networks and some issues particularly created by utilization of radio signals as virtual
links. We then investigate network monitoring schemes that usually are employed for assessing network performance.
Subsequently, we present certain techniques for analyzing network traffic that could be applied to detect rogue APs. We
further discuss issues related to MAC protocol misbehavior and then study DOMINNO in [12], a scheme developed for
detection of IEEE 802.11 greedy users, followed by the conclusion of the article.
2. Ethernet and IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN
This section explores both IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN (Wi-Fi) MAC and Ethernet’s multiple access protocols to figure out
what differences potentially rise in use of these two different network technologies.
In the mid-1970, Bob Metcalfe and David Boggs developed the original Ethernet architecture, which was the first ever
high speed LAN system [1]. One advantage of Ethernet compared to Wi-Fi is that a network adapter is able to sense signal
energy fromother adapterswhich are sending frames [1]. This feature enables collision detection, and thus Ethernet employs
the carrier sense multiple access with collision detection (CSMA/CD) protocol. In the CSMA/CD protocol, when channel is
free, a network adapter can immediately start sending frames. On the other hand, if it is busy, an adapter just waits until
no more signal energy can be sensed on the channel and then starts transmitting. However, if a network adapter, during its
frame transmission, also senses signal energy from another adapter, it then stops transmitting, sends a jam signal into the
channel and gets into an exponential backoff phase [1].
Obviously, in a Wi-Fi network, wireless stations and an AP (AP) cannot be interconnected with cables. Wireless signals
basically propagate through the air between terminals and an AP making virtual links while in turn suffering interference
or jamming which causes more difficult issues to be handled, such as higher bit-error rates, than Ethernet [1]. Typically,
two disadvantages compared to Ethernet must be taken into account to implement an efficient multiple access protocol in
Wi-Fi [1]: (1) it is too costly for adapters to have the functionality to send and receive signals at the same time; (2) it is
impossible for adapters to detect signals from hidden terminals.
Because of these twodifficulties,Wi-Fi cannot employ a collision detection (CD) scheme, but instead it employs a collision
avoidance (CA) scheme. Compared to CSMA/CD, one noticeable difference of CSMA/CA is that a station gets into a random
backoff phase whenever its network adapter senses channel busy or does not receive any acknowledgement in response
to its sending frame [1]. On the other hand, in Ethernet, a station only suffers random backoffs when its network adapter
experiences signal energy during its frame transmission (collision) [1].
Furthermore, in order to avoid high bit-errors, Wi-Fi also employs link layer acknowledgement to check whether each
frame can reach the destination and remain intact. Hence, a sender that does not receive an ACK from the destination in
response to its transmitting frame will start over the same transmission again based on CSMA/CA.
Moreover, to cope with the hidden terminal problem, Wi-Fi utilizes auxiliary frames, called Request to Send (RTS) and
Clear to Send (CTS) control frames. In general, a RTS frame is sent to an access point when a wireless station wishes to
transmit a DATA frame to the destination. In response to a RTS frame, when the requested channel is not busy, a CTS frame
is broadcasted by the AP as an acknowledgement to the sender. A CTS frame additionally plays another important role by
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restricting data transmissions from other stations [1]. This collision avoidance mechanism along with CSMA/CA forms an
important part of the IEEE Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) method.
However, this link layer acknowledgement and RTS/CTS frame exchange potentially delays network traffic, where it takes
longer time to send entire data to destination. Authors in [4] focused on these delays to distinct network traffic out of rogue
APs from wired terminals.
3. More about IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs
Accordingly, it is obvious that traffic in a computer network consisting of only wired links (e.g., Ethernet) and that
including wireless connectivity (e.g., Wi-Fi) have different characteristics. By examining inter-packet spacing of network
traffic, for example, work in [4] successfully discriminates networks that include wireless links and those not including
them in order to detect rogue APs. Thus, in the next two subsections, we summarize peculiar network traffic characteristics
and problems of Wi-Fi in comparison to Ethernet.
3.1. Problems in IEEE 802.11
Apparently, it is harder tomaintain consistent, robust and secure communications in an IEEE 802.11wireless LAN (Wi-Fi)
than in Ethernet because of the nature of the wireless medium. In other words, several problems exist peculiarly in use of
Wi-Fi: connectivity problems, performance problems and network security [5].
In utilization of radio signals, Wi-Fi cannot provide network users with consistent access to the Internet. For example,
even in a small building that can be covered by an AP, such as a network cafe, some spaces are hidden from radio signals
by obstacles. Such spaces are called ‘‘dead spots’’ or ‘‘RF holes’’, and typically this problem is resolved by deploying more
APs [5].
Accordingly, since associations between APs and wireless stations are made by virtual wires inWi-Fi, they are physically
inconsistent and vulnerable to interference in surrounding devices, such as amicrowave oven and cordless phones aswell as
other APs operating nearby. Additionally, these virtualwires easily allow radio signals to take different paths to a destination,
causingmultipath propagation problem [6]. More precisely, while some radio signals head directly to the destination, others
may bounce back from obstacles and suffer longer delays to the destination. The previously described characteristics of IEEE
802.11 apparently increase retransmissions, resulting in degradation of communication performance.
With respect to network security, one of the problems to be considered is installation of unauthorized APs or rogue
APs [5]. Unsecured rogue APs are likely to be security holes for enterprise networks and could provide access to unauthorized
users. Recently, problems caused by rogue APs have been very common, and installations of them are typically done by
ignorant enterprise employees. In practice, detecting rogue APs, though more efficient ways have been developed, still
counts on a very rudimentary way, where equipped IT personnel walk around the buildings catching beacons fromwireless
APs and identifying their MAC addresses.
On the other hand, for wireless network users, accessing unsecured APs that are not protected by passwords may raise
a threat, nicknamed as ‘‘evil twins’’. Work in [7] reports that evil twins are dummy APs that are intentionally deployed by
adversaries targeting to intercept sensitive data from associatingwireless stations. Thus, during associationswith evil twins,
all transmitting packets could be logged and the ones without encryption could be analyzed thereafter. Furthermore, evil
twins often send stronger signals than legitimate APs in order to grab wireless connections from the legitimate ones [7].
However, even with encryption and pseudonyms, attackers with expertise can read user information and distinguish them
from others by utilization of fingerprinting techniques (i.e., identify the sender of the packets) [2].
3.2. IEEE 802.11 traffic characterization
Especially in a hotspot setting, IEEE 802.11 traffic may suffer plenty of retransmissions that can be used as a metric
to distinguish Wi-Fi from a wired network. Authors in [8] experimentally demonstrated that Wi-Fi suffers high rate of
retransmissions due to channel contention and interferences. In general, retransmission time of Wi-Fi in a hotspot setting
occupies 28% of all data transmissions and 46% of data transmission time [8]. In addition to retransmissions, there is extra
overhead originated from PHY and MAC headers as well as control frame transmissions, such as RTS and CTS. Thus, in
practice, only 40% of time is available for transmitting data packets and the remaining time is consumed in retransmission,
acknowledgement and management traffic (as indicated in Table 1 [8]).
According to Table 1, more than half of all transmitted frames are control andmanagement frames, whereas they usually
consist of fewer bits, such that in terms of transferred bits they occupymerely less than 10% of the total bits. However, since
802.11 sends control and management frames in a low transmission rate (usually 1 Mbps), utilization of the medium by
these frames rises more than the occupancy of the frames.
Moreover, the 802.11 retransmissions severely affect its performance. From Table 1, 28% of the data frames are
retransmissions. As a result, nearly half of the data frame airtime is spent by these frames. Authors in [8] mentioned that
basically two factors increase a retransmission rate: signal strength and contention level. According to [8], retransmissions
in Wi-Fi are proportional to the contention level and inversely related to the signal strength.
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Table 1
Network traffic characteristics of IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN (Wi-Fi).
Frame type and subtype Airtime (s) Bits (MB) Frames (1000s) Avg. rate (Mbps)
Data 6802 1884 5540 6.46
Originals 3616 1276 3988 7.30
Retransmits 3185 608 1552 4.31
Control 1418 74 5442 1.89
Ack. 1332 69 5135 1.90
RTS 42 3 142 1.69
CTS 40 2 155 1.75
PS poll 2 0 10 1.60
Management 878 82 1098 1.12
Assoc. req. 1 0 2 1.42
Assoc. res. 1 0 3 1.08
Authentication 6 0 13 1.13
Beacon frame 412 39 428 1.00
Deauth. 0 0 0 1.30
Dissassoc. 6 0.40 13794 1.00
Probe req. 177 16.07 333707 1.35
Probe res. 270 25.44 296250 1.00
Reassoc. req. 0 0.03 2727 1.00
Reassoc. res. 0 0.03 621 1.00
Totals 9098 2040 12080 3.92
(a) Wireless network traffic monitoring methodologies. (b) SNMP architecture model.
Fig. 1. Wireless monitoring and SNMP.
4. Monitoring methodology
In this section, we investigate wireless network traffic monitoring methodologies. Wireless network traffic measure-
ments are typically conducted for wireless network diagnosis and to assess the network performance. Traditionally, wire-
less network traffic is either monitored from wired vantage points (i.e., wired monitoring) or by utilizing Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) statistics [9]. However, these two schemes are not sufficient for detection of instantaneous
wireless medium characteristics, such as PHY/MAC in Wi-Fi [9]. These instantaneous characteristics usually contain rich
information of network traffic. Thus, instead, work in [9] employs wireless monitoring, in which sniffers are connected at
wireless vantage points measuring wireless network traffic in order to identify the characteristics that the previous two
monitoring schemes may miss. Work in [30,31] also considers wireless monitoring. In the next two subsections, we sum-
marize three methodologies for evaluating wireless network traffic.
4.1. Wired monitoring and SNMP statistics
In the wired monitoring, sniffers are connected directly to the wired portion of a network as shown in Fig. 1(a) [9]. Thus,
sniffers capture data and control packets that flow through network links and usually analyze them from the header infor-
mation. Under wired monitoring, Fig. 1(a) illustrates a sniffer that is connected directly to a wired portion of a LAN (a). For
SNMP querying, the figure depicts amanagementmachine that is connected to awired portion of a LAN (b), and periodically
sends SNMP queries, collects responses from APs and obtains statistics. On the other hand, in wireless monitoring, a sniffer
is deployed in a range of radio signals from APs (c), and collects PHY/MAC information directly from them.
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The SNMP protocol could be used to monitor and maintain the performance of all network devices so that a network
comprising the devices can perform efficiently. A simple SNMP architecture is represented in Fig. 1(b) and consists of
a manager application running on a management server as well as agent applications running on managed devices [9].
Typically, managed devices include host machines, wireless APs, various network equipment (such as routers, switches,
hubs), printers and UPS. The manager application periodically requests status information from each agent by checking
their Management Information Base (MIB) in order to make sure that network devices work well. Furthermore, whenever
conditions in MIB change or an important event takes place, agents notify the manager by sending a trap message.
However, since SNMP is subject to periodical polls of device’s state information by a local manager, the results are not
sensitive to instantaneous conditional changes. Typically, this interval takes one to five minutes. Thus, SNMP summaries
hardly reflect the instantaneous wireless medium characteristics, such as PHY/MAC in IEEE 802.11. Moreover, the current
MIBs of SNMP for wireless APs rarely support device’s MAC level behaviors, and they are very limited.
4.2. Wireless monitoring
In the wireless monitoring, sniffers are deployed in a Wi-Fi jungle or within radio range of multiple wireless APs. In
general, network traffic captured in this way discloses rich information about the physical and MAC layers [9].
One advantage of the wireless monitoring is easy installation of devices into networks. Let us consider IEEE 802.11
wireless LAN (Wi-Fi). Wireless devices only require to be associated with one of surrounding APs via a particular channel
before starting data communication with subnets. This creates virtual links betweenwireless devices and APs. Thus, devices
of the wireless monitoring can work independently of target networks.
Another advantage of the wireless monitoring is that unlike the wired monitoring, the wireless monitoring is quite
sensitive to physical information, such as wireless medium itself [9]. It also helps analyze physical and link layer header
information. Accordingly, it reveals signal strength, noise level and data rate for each packet as well as IEEE 802.11 type
and control fields that are derived by these headers [9,30]. Moreover, error rates and throughput performance can be also
determined from physical layer information [9].
On the other hand, sniffers of wireless monitoring should be portable to move smoothly, and thus they have limitations
in their disk sizes and processing power [9]. Furthermore, there may be dead spots or RF holes to prevent consistent
monitoring within a target site. For this reason, the efficient placement of sniffers in a Wi-Fi jungle is another issue [9].
Finally, optimization of the placement of sniffers should target to reduce cost of a monitoring system.
5. Unauthorized wireless AP detection
As we already mentioned, security vulnerabilities caused by rogue APs are very common in almost every enterprise.
Although rogue APs usually are incautiously installed by their own employees, there are many cases that are intentionally
deployed by malicious hackers trying to collect confidential and critical data from enterprises. This section briefly reviews
a mechanism of the rogue AP problem and presents the main detection schemes described in the literature. Moreover, a
classification of rogue APs is also presented.
5.1. Rogue AP classification
According to thework reported in [10], rogueAPs are classified into four categories: improperly configured, unauthorized,
phishing and compromised APs.
Several reasons are considered for legitimate APs to turn into improperly configured APs. For example, in an enterprise,
a network administrator due to the pressure for early installation of wireless LANs is hardly given sufficient time for careful
implementation. Consequently, although he/she finally finishes deploying all APs in a facility, their security settings appear
to be poor and rarely integrate similar security protocols to wired networks, such as wired equivalency protocol (WEP) [4].
Therefore, these unauthorized APs apparently form a security hole for thewhole enterprise. It is also possible that a network
administrator does not have enough knowledge of network security to set up APs properly [10]. Moreover, driver software
malfunctions or updatesmay also cause security vulnerabilities [10]. Furthermore, ad hocmode of awireless stationwithout
strong security measures may enable attackers to intrude a connected network via this station when it utilizes both wired
and wireless interfaces [10].
In most cases, unauthorized APs are installed without malicious intent and usually appear in large organizations with
many employees [10]. For instance, in an enterprise that hardly employs a wireless intrusion system because of a monetary
limitation, employees easily and incautiously connect cheap APs to the network [4,10]. However, these employees are
usually not network administration or security gurus, and therefore unsecured APs consequently form a large security hole
to malicious hackers. Accordingly, the security hole potentially exposes confidential data and gives hackers the opportunity
to compromise enterprise assets via the network [10].
On the contrary, phishing APs are deployed outside of an enterprise by attackers who try to steal employee’s usernames
and passwords [10]. Phishing APs, also called ‘‘evil twins’’, always pretend to be legitimate APs in the enterprise and, thus,
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Table 2
Classification of rogue APs and possible scenarios.
AP class Possible scenario
Improper configured Insufficient security knowledge; faulty driver; physically defective; multiple network cards
Unauthorized Connected to internal LAN without permission; External neighborhood AP
Phishing Fabricated by adversary
Compromised Disclosure of security credentials
they broadcast beacon frames which overhear from legitimate APs. From phishing APs, attackers typically initiate man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attacks [10]. Therefore, once an employee tries to connect to a company network via a phishing AP, all
communication traffic is logged and this authenticating information could be disclosed by the attacker.
Finally, legitimate APs are often cracked by WEP/WPA-PSK key cracking tools, such as Aircrack-ng, resulting in
compromised APs [10]. By using these broadly available key cracking tools, even a network novice can break encryption
of WEP/WPA-PSK in Wi-Fi [10]. With stolen secret keys, legitimate APs with the same credentials are not obstacles for
attackers anymore. Table 2 summarizes a classification of rogue APs [10].
5.2. Current rogue AP detection approaches
Currently, detection of rogue APs counts on very rudimental ways. A reasonable and also robust approach is to employ
equipped IT personnel walking around through entire buildings to search for signals or beacons of rogue APs [4]. Obviously,
this approach consumes a great deal of time as well as money and cannot be conducted on a regular basis. In some cases
by following similar approaches we can enhance the method. More specifically, instead of allowing IT personnel roaming
entire buildings, they deploy specified sensors that periodically send back unauthorized signals or beacons of wireless APs
to a central location. Although this is a more sophisticated version of the previous approach, it is still costly and inefficient
when wireless APs employ multiple frequency bands, i.e., 802.11a (in 5 GHz) and 802.11b (in 2.4 GHz).
On the other hand, some vendors, such as Cisco, developed wired approaches to detect rogue APs [4]. These approaches
check theMAC addresses of organizational routers and switcheswhether they belong to an organization or not. The rationale
of this approach is that rogue APs typically cannot show the affiliation of an organization, that is, they are not on the
organizational systemmanagement database. Instead, they may show the affiliation of their manufactures, such as Linksys.
Accordingly, routers and switches that are not owned by an organization might be deployed outside of the organization.
However, considering easy alteration of MAC addresses, it is not hard for hackers to deceive the technique as well with
cloned MAC addresses [4].
Although network administrators must have knowledge that a node might be an AP, sending a HTTP query to a residing
Web server is a possible approach to detect a rogue AP [4]. However, a drawback of this approach is that it generates
unnecessary packets in a network for scanning. Consequently, a sensitive hacker should know that rogue APs were scanned,
giving them a chance to an evasion [4].
5.3. Rogue AP detection with Wi-Fi network characteristics
The authors in [4] designed a rogue AP detection scheme utilizing an analysis of the traffic differences in a LAN network.
More precisely, their supposition is that network segments involving wireless APs should create more randomness in
network traffic than those only with wired links. For example, from their hypothesis, two networks shown in Fig. 2 should
have network traffic with different characteristics observed. In Fig. 2, another switch is inserted at a place with symbol β to
examine the case where monitoring software sniffs network traffic one hop away from a target device.
There are a couple of factors to follow this hypothesis: (1) different wireless link capacities and random backoffs due
to the congestion control make some changes in the network performance; (2) link speeds between wired and wireless
networks reveal some characteristics in network traffic. In fact, their experiments showed that each network revealed
particular characteristics in terms of the inter-packet spacing. For example, when scanning a switch residing a rogue AP,
as shown in Fig. 2, while most (more than 80%) of the packets are transferred with less than 0.001 s of the inter-packet
spacing in wired only links, in wireless links only nearly 10% of packets experience the same range of the inter-packet
spacing, but experience a longer inter-packet spacing time [4]. More specifically, the deployment of a wireless AP one hop
away from the switch (that was sniffed by network monitoring software), a network with only wired links experiences a
shorter inter-packet spacing time than the one with a rogue AP [4].
5.4. Rogue AP detection with 802.11 user fingerprinting
From the aforementioned technique, a sniffer can only detect whether a LAN consists of wireless links and APs, but
can hardly detect unauthorized APs. In order not only to detect existence of wireless links but also to identify rogue APs
in a network, the work in [5] suggested an advanced scheme utilizing a fingerprinting technique, in which, a 4-tuple
〈MAC address, SSID, channel, RSSI〉 is used to test if APs belong to an organization or they are rogue APs. In the 4-tuple
notation, channel represents which channel that an AP uses and RSSI stands for Received Signal Strength Indication. In their
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(a) A computer network with only wired links. (b) A computer network with a mixture of wired and wireless
links.
Fig. 2. Illustration of a typical computer network.
Fig. 3. A flowchart shows how to detect rogue APs from a 4-tuple 〈MAC address, SSID, channel, RSSI〉.
assumption,malicious users can alterMAC addresses of their devices tomatch those of organizationalmachines (for the sake
of intrusion). In this way, the organizational systems cannot distinguish thesemalicious nodes from their own property only
by MAC addresses, even though they were duplicated.
After receiving the 4-tuples from broadcast beacons of each AP, monitoring machines, which in [5] are called diagnostic
clients, periodically send them to diagnostic servers connecting to a local database. Diagnostic servers then compare the
fingerprints to those in the database to check if they really belong to the organization. This comparison is made by testing
each entity in the 4-tuple as shown in Fig. 3 [5]. Thus, organizations should maintain this information in their databases.
A disadvantage of this scheme is its scalability. Because diagnostic clients must cover the whole building to monitor
beacons of all deployed APs, it is apparently very expensive.
6. MAC layer misbehavior detection
Selfish user behavior as well as non-cooperative networks have been studied in the literature. A typical selfish
misbehavior may include terminals that refuse to forward packets on behalf of other hosts to conserve energy, or terminals
that knowingly modify protocol parameters to gain unfair access to the channel [11–13]. The work in [11] proposed
a modification to IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol in order to detect selfish misbehavior. The approach, however, assumed a
trustworthy receiver, which represents its major drawback. This section provides a detailed investigation of detecting
intentional misbehavior of IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol by using network traffic characteristics as an application of the IEEE
802.11 user fingerprinting.
Despite its prevalence, IEEE 802.11 standard still incurs several security holes to allow particular advanced users to have
hidden benefits with respect to network traffic. For example, IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol employs RTS/CTS frames in order to
avoid hidden terminals that cause collisions resulting in degraded network performance [1]. However, cunning IEEE 802.11
wireless network users can utilize this characteristic in their favor such that other stations can fail transmitting data for a
long time, but instead they can utilize ample bandwidth on their purpose. More precisely, in the RTS/CTS exchanging phase,
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a cheater may intentionally hit a frame against a CTS control frame addressed to the data transmission requester in order
for it not to reach him. Accordingly, the station prevented from receiving a CTS control frame has to suffer a longer backoff
interval until it is again allowed to send a RTS control frame to the AP due to the utilization of distributed coordination
function (DCF) [1,12].
Since the RTS/CTS control frames are usually combined with long DATA frames [1], cheaters may alternatively target
DATA/ACK frames to gain their network bandwidth benefits [12]. As described earlier, a data transmitter losing an ACK
frame in response to its DATA frame must get into a random backoff phase and suffer delay. As a result, cheaters can get
more chances to occupy limited bandwidth.
Another way to allow the IEEE 802.11MAC protocol to misbehave is to compromise the protocol parameters fromwhich
they can attain benefits of sharing more bandwidth on their purpose. For example, for senders, utilizing SIFS instead of
DIFS before sending a RTS control frame can apparently reduce waiting time for data transmission, and thus capture the
medium [12]. Moreover, intentionally utilizing lower contention window sizes also benefits cheaters to occupy network
bandwidth [12].
The works in [12,13] presented a detection scheme for IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol misbehavior that relies partly on the
measurement of a random backoff rather than throughput (although throughput seems to be the most intuitive metric).
This is because, although it is natural to consider that a wireless station with larger throughput must occupy higher share
of the bandwidth, the difference in throughputs, in fact, largely depends on what application wireless stations are running.
For example, two stations running two different applications, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and video streams,
apparently have different throughputs. In general, throughput is affected by toomany factors to use as ametric of the 802.11
protocol misbehavior detection [12].
DOMINO, standing for System for Detection Of greedy behavior in the MAC layer of IEEE 802.11 public NetwOrk, was
developed in [12,13] in order to detect IEEE 802.11’s greedy behavior that is initiated by sly network users to gain their
network bandwidths. The system components of DOMINO are shown in Fig. 4(a), consisting of six tests, of which the first
test (Test 1) is designed to examine scrambled CTS/ACK/DATA frames, and the others (Tests 2 through 6) are designed to
detect compromised protocol parameters. In DOMINO, a particular network characteristic in the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol
is examined in each test and whenever an anomaly is figured out, it judges whether the station is misbehaving and calls the
punishing function. Each test measures particular wireless network characteristics and compares them to training data in
order to detect anomalies.
For example, in order to capture scrambled frames in Test 1, DOMINO measures the number of repeated frames by
examining repeated sequence numbers in the header of RTS and DATA frames by retransmissions [12,13]. In other words,
stations that repeatedly retransmit their RTS andDATA frameswith same sequence numbers can be suspected to be attacked
by a sly network user, and, on the other hand, a station that successfully transmits frames during this period may be the sly
network user. Thus, determining scrambled frames is an efficient way to detect the 802.11 misbehaviors and DOMINO puts
this step at the beginning of the six tests.
In Test 2, the length of DIFS before a DATA frame is examined to figure out an anomaly.When DOMINO specifies a station
that does not wait DIFS, but instead it waits a shorter amount of time repeatedly until it starts sending a DATA frame after
DOMINO senses an ACK frame, it calls the punishing function [12,13].
Moreover, setting the network allocation vector (NAV) value longer keeps a particular wireless station occupying an AP
unnecessarily without interruption during this time. Thus, comparison of the actual transmission time to the NAV value in
the header of RTS or DATA frame can be used for detection of the 802.11 misbehaviors, and Test 3 does this measurement
[12,13].
Another characteristic of the 802.11’s greedy behavior is shorter maximum random backoffs. Basically, the duration of
random backoffs is determined in relation to the number of retransmissions. That is, the more a station retransmits frames
the longer randombackoff time it has. Regarding themaximum randombackoffs, thework in [12]makes an assumption that
they should eventually become close to CWmin − 1 from large samples. Thus, in Test 4, by comparing them to a predefined
threshold (thresholdmaxbkf), DOMINO can detect stations that have shorter backoff times.
In addition to the maximum backoff time, the paper [12] also suggested to detect shorter actual backoffs in order to
determine the 802.11’s greedy behavior. The actual backoff duration is determined as shown in Fig. 4(b) [12]. In general,
stations having shorter actual backoff times can be suspected as cheaters. In the previous case, DOMINO compares them to
the nominal backoff value (Bacnom) and suspects stations that have shorter backoff time than the threshold.
At last, DOMINO examines consecutive backoffs caused by the MAC layer queuing in Test 6, as shown in Fig. 4(c) [12,13].
When frames are not interleaved by other frames, duration between two frames typically consists of DIFS and a random
backoff due to the channel contention. Measuring this duration can help detecting greedy behaviors from TCP sources. This
is an actual backoff metric in Test 5 and it does not work well for TCP sources because for those sources delays are mainly
caused by TCP congestion control [12,13]. Hence, examining duration of consecutive backoffs in TCP sources in Test 6 can
help concluding indecisive results from Test 5.
7. User detection with IEEE 802.11 user fingerprints
Like a human fingerprint, network traffic has unique characteristics that can be used to identify a sender device. People
usually called these characteristics a network user fingerprint. Some characteristics can perfectly help to associate packets
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(a) DOMINO: The 802.11 misbehavior
detection scheme.
Fig. 4. DOMINO architecture.
with a sender, whereas some can only conduct nearly perfect association. The former characteristics are called explicit
identifiers, which include the MAC address [2]. In the latter case, characteristics of some traffic samples may overlap, or
in the other words these traffic characteristics are not necessarily unique to each sender, but the combination of these
characteristics can sufficiently differentiates senders. Thus, these characteristics are called implicit identifiers [2]. In this
section, we investigate these two network traffic identifiers and propose a technique that can successfully associate implicit
identifiers with network users.
7.1. Explicit identifiers
Explicit identifiers can uniquely differentiate network devices. Traffic samples containing these identifiers must be
associatedwith their sender devices. For example, theMAC address of a network adapter is used to distinguish each adapter.
Basically, the assignment of theMAC address is controlled by IEEE, and in production of each network adaptermanufacturers
require to purchase a set of free address space. Unique MAC addresses are assigned to unique network adapters by the
manufacturers, such that they can peculiarly identify them [1]. Unlike the IP address, which is dynamically assigned in each
session and sensitive to a device’s location, theMAC address is static and persistent during the adapter’s entire life. In the link
layer protocol, corresponding destination and sender’s MAC addresses are basically put in the packet headers. For instance,
the MAC address of a device is analogy to the social security number of a person regardless of its movement, and the social
security number of a person must be kept the same, no matter where he/she moves. On the other hand, an IP address is
considered as a postal address of a person because it is sensitive to a human location where he/she lives. Thus, when a
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(b) Computation of the actual backoff time.
(c) A figure represents two consecutive frames from source S.
Fig. 4. (continued)
wireless network does not employ the link layer cryptography, a sender of packets is easily disclosed to attackers via some
of explicit identifiers.
To conceal MAC address information accompanied with the packet header, several papers proposed MAC address
pseudonymous techniques [2]. For example, by periodically changing a MAC address to a temporary unlinked name, a
user prevents adversaries from associating the MAC address with his/her device. However, the MAC address pseudonym
cannot be applied frequently. One reason is that awireless station suffers difficulties to reassociatewith an AP from frequent
MAC address changes. Also, it requires reauthentication with some web pages. These situations may apparently generate
overhead for wireless network communications.
7.2. Implicit identifiers
Another type of network traffic identifier is called implicit identifiers. The work done in [2] provided four major implicit
identifiers to experimentally measure the accuracy of using individual and combination of them. A list of these implicit
identifiers is given as follows: (1) Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs), (2) Network destinations, (3) Broadcast packet sizes, and
(4) MAC protocol fields.
Unlike explicit identifiers, such as the MAC address, implicit identifiers cannot be associated directly with senders but
theymay have unique characteristics to be distinguished fromother traffic. For example, when aWindowsmachine initiates
a wireless connection, it tries to find out user’s preferred networks by sending requests with network names, or Service Set
Identifiers (SSIDs) (active probing) [2]. Since these requests cannot be encrypted before association, they are easily overheard
by any user with a network protocol analyzer [2]. Thus, by eavesdropping on SSID requests, it is possible for other people (no
matter good or bad) in the same network to distinguish network traffic and finally link them to each user [2]. Although SSIDs
derived from traffic samples are not necessarily unique to users and wireless networks (because it is possible that several
users share a single network (AP), and alsomore than onenetworkmayhave the same SSID), a set of SSIDsmayproduce some
dissimilarity to distinguish the traffic samples. Because aWindowsmachine creates a user original SSID list and probe SSIDs
for it periodically (regarding their combination here), authors in [2] demonstrated its uniqueness from their experimental
trace of IEEE 802.11 traffic. Moreover, they also showed that it is possible not only to identify traffic samples but also figure
out geographical information for users from the IEEE 802.11 probes. This can be achieved when an eavesdropper obtains
the location of wireless APs supplied byWiGLE.net [2,3]. WiGLE.net [3] basically provides geographical information for each
IEEE 802.11 AP by name (SSID), such as which AP is deployed where. For example, from the 2004 SIGCOMM trace given
in [2], one user broadcasted his SSID probes, such as ‘‘University of Washington’’ and ‘‘dwj’’. Thus, from a hint of ‘‘University
of Washington’’, they searched for SSID ‘‘dwj’’ around the Seattle area and eventually found out only one SSID having such
a name. In this example, WiGLE.net [3] detected the location of this person’s home within 192 ft.
Another example of the implicit identifier is a network destination which is a pair of an IP address and a port number [2].
Usually, user-visitingwebsites are distributed in a form of Zipf distribution. That is, a fewmajor web sites are called at by the
majority of users, whereas a lot of other sites are called at nearly individually, which was at most 1.2 users for each website
from the 2004 SIGCOMM trace [2]. This comes from the fact that users usually have their preferred web e-mail services, and
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also keep bookmarks for their preferred web sites in the web browsers. Thus by tracking network destinations, an observer
can form a URL preference of each user.
Broadcast packets are sent by applications requiring constantly receiving updates from their vender’s servers. In [2], a
packet size of each advertisement also forms a unique characteristic, and thus it can make a difference as an application
and a packet size pairs do. Work carried out in [2] actually showed a list of applications and its port numbers as well as
how many times packet sizes appear at the 2004 SIGCMOMM conference. Although the size of the most applications in the
list exhibit the uniqueness, some wireless driver or OS and DHCP come out many times in the trace. This is because these
applications are common to every user to manage an IP address and advertise its low power mode, respectively. Thus these
applications should be ruled out for fingerprinting network traffic [2].
Usually, MAC header information alone tells less about their users than the other three implicit identifiers, but it can be
used together with other identifiers to enhance the implicit identifier discriminability. A combination of bits in the MAC
header, such as, ‘‘more fragments’’, ‘‘retry’’, ‘‘power management’’ and ‘‘order’’, as well as an authentication type and a
transmission rate can nearly specify user’s identity and it is considered to be persistent. This is because different NICs are
likely to have different configurations of these fields [2].
7.3. Classifier
In order to make the implicit identifiers useful, a classifier must be designed with a threshold. Basically, a classifier is
used to check if some condition (threshold) is satisfied by existing evidence (combination of implicit identifiers) to tell
where traffic samples come from the target. For example, authors in [2] prepared a simple classifier CU and a threshold T
so as to answer a question like: ‘‘Did this sample come from user U?’’. The classifier answers this question with ‘‘Yes’’ if a
computed value exceeds the threshold T , and ‘‘No’’ otherwise. This classifier is computed by a combination of conditional
probabilities using Bayes’ theorem and probabilities generated by quantifying each implicit identifier, and they also call it a
feature. In other words, this classifier will find out a probability, such as ‘‘With a given sample with features f1, f2, . . ., fm, a
probability that the sample came from user U ’’ and this is computed by a formula as
Pr[s is from U|s has f1, f2, . . . , fm] =
m∏
i





where Pr[s has fi|s is from U] and Pr[s has fi] are previously calculated from training data and quantified features. On the
other hand, since Pr[s is from fi] depends largely on the belief of the observers about how frequently the target is supposed
to appear in the network [2] although it is calculated from training data, it may be biased by an individual observation.
Additionally, the calculation of the probability above counts on quantified features. For example, in the field of implicit
identifier, which involves several field values in the MAC header, an authentication type and a transmission rate, each
combination of matching field values must generate a different value [2]. More precisely, matching only a bit in ‘‘more
fragments’’ field and bits in all the three fields (i.e., ‘‘retry’’, ‘‘power management’’ and ‘‘order’’) with training data must
generate different values, and more precisely to say, the latter must indicate being more identifiable.
On the other hand,when converting a set of discrete values, such as netdests, into somequantity, the authors in [2] applied








where ProfileU is a union of elements of any feature obtained from every training sample from user U , Sets is the set of
elements from a sample s, and w(e) is the weight of a element e. For example, the netdests identifier comprises a number
of destinations addressed by the target. Then, the ratio of the sum of weighted destinations captured during the sampling
period to the sum of those captured during the training period makes a quantified feature of sample s.
A major difference between explicit and implicit identifiers is, while the explicit identifiers can be connected directly to
each network device, the implicit identifiers cannot be always done in the same way. Although recent researches suggested
the necessity of a pseudonym for explicit identifiers, even with implicit identifiers more than 60% of users are identified
with 90% of accuracy [2].
8. Conclusion
In this article, we summarized current researches on wireless network traffic analysis and a user finger printing
technique. Currently, network traffic analyses are mainly used for security enhancement and performance maintenance.
However, these noble techniques are also expected to expand to other research areas in computer science. From our
observation, these techniques can be of practical use in digital criminal investigations, digital forensics, and intrusion
detection.
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In fact, there are plenty more papers related to fingerprint and signatures, and the readers can refer to [14–29].
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